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Broadening the Scope of Our Understanding of Mechanisms: 
Lessons from the History of the Morning-After Pill 
Abstract: Philosophers of science and medicine now aspire to provide useful, socially relevant 
accounts of mechanism. Existing accounts have forged the path by attending to mechanisms in 
historical context, scientific practice, the special sciences, and policy. Yet, their primary focus 
has been on more proximate issues related to therapeutic effectiveness. To take the next step 
toward social relevance, we must investigate the challenges facing researchers, clinicians, and 
policy makers involving values and social context. Accordingly, we learn valuable lessons about 
the connections between mechanistic processes and more fundamental reasons for (or against) 
medical interventions, particularly moral, ethical, religious, and political concerns about health, 
agency, and power. This paper uses debates over the controversial morning-after pill (emergency 
contraception) to gain insight into the deeper reasons for the production and use of mechanistic 
knowledge throughout biomedical research, clinical practice, and governmental regulation. To 
practice socially relevant philosophy of science, I argue that we need to account for mechanistic 
knowledge beyond immediate effectiveness, such as how it can also provide moral guidance, aid 
ethical categorization in the clinic, and function as a political instrument. Such insights have 
implications for medical epistemology, including the value-laden dimensions of mechanistic 
reasoning and the “epistemic friction” of values. Furthermore, there are broader impacts for 
teaching research ethics and understanding the role of science advisors as political advocates. 
 
1. Introduction 
Thinking about mechanisms—that is, how something works, acts, or causes an effect—pervades 
scientific reasoning and policy making. Accordingly, philosophers of science have sought to 
Unblinded Manuscript Click here to view linked References
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provide accounts of mechanism that are useful for both researchers and policy makers. For 
instance, Carl Craver and Lindley Darden (2013, p. xviii) intend to “write a practically useful 
book for those engaged in discovery” by offering to contemporary researchers a framework of 
mechanism and strategies from the history of science. More geared toward policy makers, 
Federica Russo and Jon Williamson offer an alternative account of mechanisms to critique the 
evidence hierarchies that guide public-health policy, such as measuring environmental exposure 
and reducing obesity (Russo 2012; Russo and Williamson 2012). For an even broader audience, 
Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie (2012, p. 5) provide a guidebook for Evidence-Based 
Policy involving mechanistic reasoning, intended to be accessible to experts and laypeople 
involved in policy making including “classroom teachers thinking about homework, city councils 
deciding whether to build a leisure center, or government ministers contemplating drug policies.” 
Clearly, these philosophers of science and medicine hope to provide practical and applicable 
accounts of mechanism.  
 Existing accounts have forged the path to scientific and social relevance. They have 
looked at mechanistic reasoning in its historical context and in practice (e.g., Machamer et al. 
2000; Darden 2006; Craver & Darden 2013), and they have expanded to include various special 
sciences and public policy (e.g., Illari & Williamson 2012; Russo 2012; Clarke et al. 2014).1 
First and foremost, philosophers of mechanism have sought to elucidate the reasoning by which 
scientists employ to connect a phenomenon with its causes, organization, processes, and parts 
                                                          
1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that socially relevant philosophy is the next step 
in the philosophy of mechanisms after the turns to history, practice, and the special sciences.   
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(for reviews, see Craver and Tabery 2017; Glennan 2016; Illari and Williamson 2012).2 In 
biomedicine and health policy, they have shown in a variety of ways how mechanistic 
knowledge and reasoning involves the effectiveness of a treatment (i.e., its ability to produce an 
effect). They have found three possible roles for mechanisms in medicine that map onto the 
contexts of discovery, justification, and application, which I call the heuristic, evidential, and 
instrumental functions.3 First, the search for mechanisms of effective treatments has guided the 
methodology of how such knowledge is sought heuristically (Darden 2006; Craver and Darden 
2013; Solomon 2015). Once found, mechanisms help clinicians to evidence claims about 
effectiveness epistemically (Russo and Williamson 2011; Howick 2011). Then, in policy making 
and society more generally, mechanistic reasoning provides an instrumental aid for making 
                                                          
2 Overlooking some of the differences between their accounts, the specifics range from organized 
entities and activities that operate regularly and cyclically (Machamer et al. 2000) and complex 
systems whose parts interact directly and invariantly to make a difference between variables 
(Glennan 2002) to a structure performing a function by virtue of its organized parts (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005). However, for my purpose of understanding the production and use of 
mechanistic knowledge, these nuanced distinctions are immaterial.  
3 There has been extensive philosophical debate over the sharpness of these context-based 
distinctions and their epistemic import (see Schickore and Steinle 2006). Nevertheless, if 
understood as loosely overlapping phases operating throughout inquiry, they provide a useful 
structure for framing my analysis.  
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effective interventions and applications (Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Russo 2012).4   
Now, if we want to practice socially relevant philosophy of science, we must attend to the 
issues that are important to researchers, clinicians, and policy makers, particularly those 
involving human values and social context (Fehr and Plaisance 2010; Weaver 2017). While these 
philosophical accounts of mechanism have provided insightful analyses into more proximate 
issues related to therapeutic effectiveness, the time has come to explore the deeper challenges 
facing researchers, clinicians, and policy makers. These issues involve value questions about 
morality, ethics, and religion and the politics associated with the production and use of 
knowledge about mechanisms. Philosophers have argued forcefully for the importance of 
accounting for how context and values shape scientific research and science policy (Douglas 
2009; Elliott 2011; Kitcher 2011; Longino 1990). For instance, the questions scientists ask—and 
the projects that get funded—are limited to those which they take to be significant, requiring 
value judgments about priority, framing, and use into the production of knowledge. Furthermore, 
managing different empirical uncertainties such as underdetermination and inductive risk also 
requires value judgments, often relying on contextual values with societal stakes (ChoGlueck 
2018). To achieve social relevance, philosophers of mechanism should take this next step to 
broaden their accounts by including the interplay between science, medicine, and society. 
Using an in-depth case study of the mechanism of the morning-after pill (emergency 
contraception), this paper argues that, antecedent to producing effective treatments, mechanistic 
knowledge relates to broader beliefs about health, agency, and power involving human values. 
                                                          
4 Since I aim to expand and then reframe the discussion, I will not evaluate these existing 
arguments, although I will note criticisms (see footnotes 5, 7, 8, and 9). 
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Here, researchers and policy makers produce and use mechanistic knowledge to determine what 
forms of effectiveness and what treatments are desirable in the first place. For one, we shall see 
how during initial development mechanistic knowledge can provide researchers with moral 
guidance regarding how to follow religious and ethical codes and to achieve political goals. 
Second, mechanistic reasoning can also help physicians in clinics categorize treatments over 
ethically loaded terrain. Third, it can equip researchers and healthcare professionals with the 
useful sort of scientific information needed for political advocacy. Rather than a simple 
epistemic means to effective intervention—the focus of existing philosophical accounts—
knowing and understanding mechanisms is a crucial aspect of many ethical, political, and social 
controversies. Accordingly, this paper argues that the time is ripe for philosophers to expand and 
reframe the discussion of mechanisms in medicine to attend to these humanistic and cultural 
aspects of mechanistic reasoning.  
While this paper’s immediate aim is descriptive, ultimately it enables a more critical 
project: understanding how mechanistic knowledge is used in biomedicine and health policy in 
order to improve it. For one, my analysis showcases value-laden dimensions of mechanistic 
reasoning and how they vary across context. In particular, we see how values create “epistemic 
friction.” Values in early research and development shape the expertise and knowledge available 
(and absent). Values in clinics and hospitals promote the development of new classificatory 
schemes for novel, contentious treatments. The values of public advocacy groups prompt 
scientists to produce and promulgate specific forms of information for patients, governmental 
agencies, and courts.   
Moreover, controversies over the mechanisms of contraceptives have enormous societal 
significance. The World Health Organization lists these “emergency contraceptives”—taken 
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after sexual intercourse to reduce the chance of unwanted pregnancy—as a core essential 
medicine (WHO 2017, p. 40, 18.3.1). Virtually all women in the US have used contraception at 
one point in their lives (Daniels, Mosher, et al. 2013), and over last decade, 11% (5.8 million) of 
US women of reproductive age had used emergency contraception specifically (Daniels, Jones, 
et al. 2013). One key obstacle to women’s access to this important drug, as we shall see, has been 
concerns about its mechanism related to ethical and religious objections to abortion, particularly 
from Roman Catholics, entangling medical epistemology with reproductive ethics and gender 
politics.  
An integrated methodology in history and philosophy of science (HPS) grounds this 
paper’s aim at socially engaged philosophy. To articulate the challenges that researchers, 
doctors, and science advisors faced when producing and using knowledge about this mechanism, 
my analysis moves iteratively from the more abstract discussion of philosophers to the concrete 
details of history and back again (for a similar approach, see H. Chang 2011). As an HPS project, 
this paper seeks to provide lessons for philosophers about different aspects of mechanistic 
knowledge by working through three episodes in the history of the morning-after pill. Rather 
than merely reporting a case study based on historians’ secondary accounts and then generalizing 
from it, I have conducted historical research from primary and secondary sources, which I use to 
make my own historical account and then engage critically with the relevant philosophical 
literature. I have utilized new primary sources, such as commentaries from Catholic physicians’ 
journals and related Catholic hospital directives, Planned Parenthood conference proceedings, 
and peer-reviewed articles on emergency contraception. I have also drawn upon a wide variety of 
secondary sources, including Heather Prescott’s ground-breaking (2011) monograph on the 
history of the morning-after pill, Lisa Wynn and Angel Foster’s (2012) collected volume on the 
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International Consortium for Emergency Contraception, Patricia Miller’s (2015) history of 
debates over abortion among American Catholics, and Daniel Williams’s (2016) pre-history of 
the Pro-Life Movement. Nevertheless, unlike these other histories involving emergency 
contraception, particularly Prescott’s (2011), my narrative highlights the long-standing concern 
with the pill’s mechanism from both women’s health advocates and anti-abortionists throughout 
the past fifty years. In particular, I trace the shifting functions afforded to mechanistic knowledge 
by people with different values and in different contexts. For geographical comparison, my 
account moves throughout North and South America, where most of the research was conducted 
and where several of the most contentious political battles took place. 
Each section discusses the way philosophers have construed mechanistic knowledge or 
reasoning, followed by my own narrative and analysis of a different or broader function. This 
HPS iteration between history and philosophy takes us through several milestones in the saga of 
the morning-after pill, including its initial development, its subsequent clinical use, and its later 
governmental regulation. The chronology begins in the 1960s, during the spread of the first 
hormonal contraceptives, when research on the alternative “day-after” pills began in the US. 
Section 2 delves into how reasoning about post-coital mechanisms during this early development 
engaged researchers morally, either toward or against intervention—particularly Catholic doctors 
in the face of prohibitions on contraception and abortion from the Vatican. The next milestone is 
the spread of the first morning-after pill to clinics and hospitals throughout the world in the late 
1960s and early ‘70s (before the discovery of the health risks of estrogen). Section 3 contrasts 
the different schemes employed by clinicians and hospital administrators for categorizing the 
new (off label) treatment as a contraceptive or abortifacient. The final milestone is the 
governmental regulation of safer progestin-based emergency contraceptives in the late 1990s and 
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early 2000s, including legislative battles and court cases over women’s access to this drug. 
Section 4 covers two of these recent struggles in the US and Chile, where scientists used 
mechanistic information as a political instrument either for women’s agency in healthcare or for 
provider’s rights to refuse offering these pills.  
Reflecting on these insights, Section 5 argues that mechanistic knowledge is produced 
and used not only for understanding or utilizing effectiveness but more generally for promoting 
health; this broader understanding involves human life, norms, and values. There, I discuss how 
these lessons apply more broadly to other cases of mechanistic knowledge because of the 
relations of treatment mechanisms to cultural norms, ethical values, and economic currency. 
Section 6 discusses the implications of expanding beyond our current understanding of 
mechanisms for philosophy and society, spanning from the relations between values and 
mechanistic knowledge to the teaching of research ethics and the role of science advisers.  
 
 2. Moral Guidance for/against Intervention after Coitus 
We begin with the search for mechanisms during early research and development. In the so-
called context of discovery, philosophers have shown how mechanistic reasoning is significant 
for its heuristic function (Craver and Darden 2013; Darden 2006; Solomon 2015). Typically, 
drugs and other treatments must be researched and developed before they can be tested in human 
trials, evaluated by governments, and prescribed by physicians. Often this search in the field of 
“translational medicine” is framed around pathological and physiological mechanisms, which 
guide researchers by structuring their discovery toward fruitful outputs (Solomon 2015). Rather 
than thinking of discovery as a boundless endeavor without rules, Darden (2006) argues that 
9 
 
mechanisms provide a logic of discovery. Therefore, if the goal is to discover mechanisms, there 
are many advisable strategies based on the history of science (see also Thagard 2011). She 
discusses these strategies at length, such as for the construction of hypotheses, evaluation of their 
plausibility, and revision according to new developments. For Darden, and others like Craver and 
Miriam Solomon, the significance of mechanisms during early research is first as the epistemic 
goal of inquiry and second as a heuristic that provides the means for achieving that goal (Craver 
and Darden 2013; Solomon 2015; see also La Caze 2011).5  
In this section, I contend that mechanistic reasoning provides more than a heuristic for 
discovery by affording moral guidance over when and whether to intervene. To intervene, or not 
to intervene, that was the question—but it was a moral question for individual researchers to 
discern. For the morning-after pill, thinking about the mechanism did guide initial development 
as well as later refinements toward more safe and effective formulations (e.g., Glasier et al. 
1992; Morris, Van Wagenen, Hurteau, et al. 1967). However, it would be misleading to say that 
simply guiding detached discovery was the chief reason for scientists’ mechanistic interests. 
Instead, their main interest in this mechanism was over its relation to the ethics of reproduction 
and the politics of women’s health. Mechanistic reasoning provided researchers with a distinctly 
moral form of guidance regarding their ethical codes, religious beliefs, and political goals. 
Developers of the pill were proponents of contraception regardless of when it worked, typically 
                                                          
5 In contrast, Jeremey Howick (2011) argues that mechanistic reasoning is not a reliable heuristic 
because of its high cost-to-benefit ratio.  
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for eugenics and population control.6 Detractors spurned late-acting pills as equivalent to 
abortion, which they condemned mostly for religious reasons (as Roman Catholics). As we shall 
see, reasoning about the mechanism of this drug-in-development crucially influenced research 
personnel, shaping the expertise and knowledge available or absent during early development.  
For these advocates and critics of this pill, their prior collaboration during the 1950s 
framed their relationship and their interest in contraception. Biologist Min Chueh Chang 
(b.1908—d.1991) and physician John Rock (b.1890—d.1984) worked together to develop what 
became “The Pill” with the support and direction of the Worcester Foundation for Experimental 
Biology (WFEB) in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts. Chang was an experimental biologist trained at 
Cambridge, who began working at WFEB in 1945 on fertilization under the direction of co-
founder Gregory Pincus (b.1903—d.1967). Along with intellectual curiosity about the process of 
fertilization, personal eugenic concerns about unchecked population growth motivated the 
contraceptive research of Chang and Pincus (M. C. Chang 1968; Greep 1995).  
 Rock was also affiliated with Worchester, having conducted the Pill’s preliminary human 
tests at his Massachusetts clinic and co-directed the later trials in Puerto Rico. For improving 
marital relations overburdened by children, this Catholic physician founded the first free birth-
control clinic in Massachusetts in the late-1930s (Marsh and Ronner 2008, p. 147). Rock and 
Chang’s collaboration with others, including feminist-eugenicist social reformers Margret Sanger 
                                                          
6 Unlike the developers themselves, some of their collaborators and patrons were feminists 
committed to women’s liberation, such as Margret Sanger and Katharine Dexter McCormick. 
Nevertheless, they were all motivated to some degree by eugenics and the need for population 
control (see Marks 2001; Marsh and Ronner 2008). 
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and Katharine Dexter McCormick, paved the way for the first hormonal contraceptive Enovid, 
approved in 1960 (see Marks 2001; Tone 2001; Marsh and Ronner 2008).  
 Rock’s support of hormonal contraception put him at odds with most other Catholic 
physicians of the day (see Williams 2016). Moreover, he deviated from Catholic teaching in his 
support of artificial contraception because of his understanding of its mechanism. In 1963 he 
published a widely popular book, titled The Time Has Come: A Catholic Doctor’s Proposals to 
End the Battle over Birth Control. There, he argued that progesterone merely prevents ovulation 
to extend the natural “safe period” of infertility. Catholic social teaching allowed couples to use 
the natural method of infertile periods for family planning. Thus, Rock argued that a “pill-
established safe period” should have the same moral and theological implications (Rock 1963, 
pp. 168–69).  
 Nonetheless, apart from contraception, the Catholic social teaching that abortion is a 
mortal sin begins at fertilization when egg and sperm fuse. This stance relies in part on the 
ontological and ethical beliefs that, once a life has a human soul, it is a full human person and 
that ensoulment happens at fertilization, hence the “conception” of the person (see Miller 2014, 
pp. 60-63; Williams 2016, p. 12). This ontological issue of where a woman’s body ends and 
another person’s begins has ethical implications for bodily autonomy and its limits. Under 
Catholic teaching, ending the life of a zygote (fertilized egg) or more developed fetus constitutes 
the immoral killing of an innocent person and thus was prohibited at Catholic hospitals (NCCB 
1971). Thus, entwined with the moral status of the zygote are the ethics and politics of 
motherhood, particularly the rights and responsibilities of women after fertilization, such as in 
the case of preventing pregnancy for rape survivors (Luker 1984; compare, e.g., Lynch 1977; 
McCarthy 1977).  
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 Rock believed in the moral legitimacy of abortion for the mother’s health and even 
conducted experiments on zygotes and embryos. Nonetheless, he remained uneasy about elective 
abortion and was undecided about the precise timing of ensoulment (see Marsh and Ronner 
2008, pp. 57, 241, 351 n.7). Most relevant to our story, Rock (1965) used mechanistic reasoning 
to appease other Catholic doctors who were more concerned about the risk of abortion (meaning 
termination after fertilization). The main action of progestins, he claimed, was to inhibit the 
release of an egg from the ovaries. While they do alter cervical mucous and limit endometrial 
glands, “there can be no question of an abortion if there is nothing to abort” (Rock 1965, p. 402).  
 While Rock was using mechanistic knowledge to defend this anovulatory pill, Chang 
sought more effective interventions with less of the side effects that were attracting medical and 
public concern (Watkins 1998). In 1959, he induced ovulation in rats and rabbits and then treated 
them after insemination with an antifertility agent (M. C. Chang 1959). Chang explained the 
observed “anti-zygotic activity” in terms of the compound’s effect on the transport of fertilized 
eggs through the Fallopian tubes. During the mid-60s, his research team found the estrogen 
ethinyl estradiol (EE) to be the most effective in such interference in rabbits and hamsters (M. C. 
Chang 1964; M. C. Chang and Yanagimachi 1965; M. C. Chang and Harper 1966). To make 
birth control better and solve the “so-called population explosion,” Chang thought, would require 
effective “day-after” solutions: “It is always better to reach a specific target than the whole 
system” (quoted in Lader 1966, p. 58). He targeted the embryo in transport rather than the higher 
nervous centers because the cognitive side effects (e.g., nausea, headaches, depression) “might 
be disadvantageous” for women’s health (M. C. Chang 1967, p. 387).  
But Rock disagreed that reaching this “specific target” of egg transport is “always better.” 
In a 1966 interview for the New York Times on Chang’s progress, he diverged with his old 
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teammates and indicted their new approach: “I feel this pill is an abortifacient" (Lader 1966, p. 
55). Despite having no objections to his own in vitro fertilization (IVF) experiments two decades 
earlier (Marsh and Ronner 2008, pp. 103–4), Rock would not support this post-coital pill, at least 
publicly. WFEB director Pincus responded that the new pill could not be abortifacient. Unlike 
the Catholic Church, the nascent American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) 
defined ‘pregnancy’ as beginning with implantation (see Section 3). Unlike in their previous 
collaboration, Rock’s resistance limited WFEB’s access to human subjects, so Chang stuck to his 
regular method of animal experiments in the lab. After Pincus’s death in 1967, Chang left this 
anti-fertility work to focus more on facilitating pregnancy with IVF (M. C. Chang 1968; see 
Greep 1995). 
 Two Yale professors at the university’s School of Medicine, however, did have access to 
human and non-human primates. Biologist Gertrude van Wagenen (b.1893—d.1978) was 
studying rhesus monkeys in one of the earliest captive colonies, which she began in 1935 
(Fridman 2002; Rossiter 1982). She discovered that administering high doses of estrogen led to 
infertility. Van Wagenen brought this to the attention of her colony’s clinical adviser, the 
gynecologist John Morris (b.1914—d.1993), who was interested in population control. Together 
they found that ovulation and implantation were absent after dosing monkeys with estrogens like 
EE and diethylstilbestrol (DES) (Kohorn 2009).  
 To inhibit implantation, the Yale group subsequently tested over 15 anti-fertility 
compounds in rats, rabbits, monkeys, and then humans, eventually settling on DES (Morris and 
Van Wagenen 1966; Morris, Van Wagenen, Hurteau, et al. 1967; Morris, Van Wagenen, 
McCann, et al. 1967). This synthetic estrogen already had approval of the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1941 for alleviating menopause symptoms, and it would remain on the 
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market until 1971 when its carcinogenicity in humans was established (Langston 2010). In the 
meantime, the technology begun by Chang and continued by van Wagenen and Morris 
subsequently spread throughout student health centers and hospitals in the US (Prescott 2011). 
 In sum, during this initial period of research in the ‘60s, mechanistic reasoning 
functioned as guidance for individual researchers’ moral decision making. The ethical and 
political relevance of the mechanism of the post-coital pill influenced who engaged in the 
research, why, and how they did it. Scientists with the goal of developing better population 
control such as Chang, Morris, and van Wagenen sought safer and more effective means of 
hormonal contraception. They figured that the Pill indiscriminately restructured women’s 
menstrual functioning, likely causing unnecessary side effects and possibly comprising the 
effectiveness of population control because of discontinuation. Thus, they reasoned 
mechanistically to intervene more strategically and precisely on processes besides ovulation via 
post-coital administration. Contrasted with earlier combined-oral contraceptives that were taken 
regularly and suppressed ovulation, these new post-coital methods were intentionally designed to 
act later (on egg transport, fertilization, or implantation). Better to intervene later and more 
precisely, they thought, than to undermine the effectiveness of family planning and population 
control.  
However, Chang’s relatively safer formulation using EE was neglected by the Yale 
group, in part because of Rock’s reticence over how the pill worked. His religious and ethical 
beliefs gave the mechanism special moral valence, such that interventions after ovulation were 
off-limits. Rock was willing to deviate from other Catholic physicians on the Pill because its 
action was on ovulation alone; nonetheless, he was uneasy with Chang’s newer techniques, so he 
left the team. Accordingly, his expertise in running human trials abroad for the pharmaceutical 
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company was no longer available. After Morris and van Wagenen took up the helm, they found 
both DES and EE to be effective, but they publicly promoted the use of DES (Scientific 
American 1966, p. 56). Despite their efforts to test for health harms, soon the safety of their 
procedure came under fire as the risks of DES surfaced (Hatcher and Conrad 1971; see Langston 
2010). It is plausible that Rock’s presence might have led to more testing in humans with EE, 
which is still used in lower doses for combined oral contraception. Regardless of the specific 
effect, Rock’s moral qualms undercut his former team’s ability to respond empirically to the 
Yale group. 
Thus, this moral guidance builds on the more detached heuristic function of simply 
providing a strategy for discovery/development (from Craver and Darden 2013; Darden 2006; 
Solomon 2015); it too has epistemic consequences regarding expertise and methodology. 
Reasoning about post-coital mechanisms took on ethical, political, and religious significance, 
differently engaging the expertise of Chang (and eventually van Wagenen and Morris) toward 
intervention while disengaging Rock. Accordingly, it pointed their techniques toward more 
precise interventions over more general ones, while also altering their methods of treatment and 
access to research subjects. Reasoning about mechanisms provided a distinctly moral form of 
guidance, directly relevant to the research personnel’s values about why effective post-coital 
contraception was desirable (for the goal of population control) or not (as an abortifacient 
means).  
 
3. A Scheme for Ethical Categorization: Abortion, Contraception, Both, or Neither? 
Moving from discovery to justification, we turn to the role of mechanisms in the clinical context. 
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Many philosophers of medicine have discussed the evidential function of mechanisms in clinical 
practice, i.e., for justifying claims of therapeutic effectiveness for populations of patients (Clarke 
et al. 2014; Dragulinescu 2017; Howick 2011; Illari 2011, 2017; La Caze 2011; Russo and 
Williamson 2007, 2011, 2012; Thagard 1999). Philosophers often emphasize this evidential role 
for mechanistic knowledge in their critiques of evidence hierarchies. For instance, many 
advocates of Evidence-Based Medicine rank randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and systemic 
reviews of them at the top of the hierarchy of evidence and mechanistic studies at the bottom or 
off the chart (e.g., GRADE Working Group 2004; Guyatt et al. 2015).7 Cartwright and others 
contend that while RCTs can establish a causal connection between two factors given the 
satisfaction of study assumptions, mechanisms can provide some evidence of confounding and 
non-causal correlations (Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Howick 2011; Illari 2017). Going further, 
Russo and Williamson argue that both mechanisms and RCT statistics are “normally required” 
for causal inference, although neither is necessary nor sufficient (Russo and Williamson 2012, p. 
250).8  
                                                          
7 However, one should note that it not a hierarchy of evidence per se but of methodologies 
(Bluhm 2005). For a review of critiques of Evidence-Based Medicine, and an analysis of its 
proper place in medical epistemology, see Solomon (2011, 2015). 
8 This evidential function in the strong form advocated by Russo and Williams is more contested 
than the heuristic one. Medical researchers (e.g., Guyatt et al. 2015) and institutions (e.g., the 
Cochrane Collaboration) oppose it implicitly by omission from their hierarchies of evidence. 
Several philosophers argue against the evidential function of mechanism explicitly (Andersen 
2012; Bluhm 2013; Broadbent 2011; Dragulinescu 2012; Solomon 2015), while others argue that 
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I argue that, beyond the evidentiary role of mechanisms in the clinic, they can further 
assist clinicians in developing categories (or schemes) over ethically tumultuous terrain. Granted, 
the effectiveness of the morning-after pill depends on when it is taken during a woman’s 
menstrual cycle, so clinicians have long emphasized the mechanism’s importance for 
determining the period of effectiveness (e.g., Kesserü et al. 1974) and counseling individual 
patients (e.g., Grou and Rodrigues 1994). Yet, that is only part of the story: mechanistic 
knowledge took on a different clinical function within obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) 
over categorizing the treatment, in part because of its technical novelty and its political currency 
as a tool of contested ethical quality during the era of legal reform around contraception and 
abortion. The liminal status of this new technology prompted clinicians to revisit the old 
definitions of ‘contraception,’ ‘pregnancy,’ and ‘abortion’ and to grapple with the uncertainty of 
the mechanism. In newfound clinical contexts, supportive scientists and medical professionals 
sought to separate the categories of post-coital contraceptive and abortifacient, while 
contraception critics and anti-abortionists, particularly Catholics, rejected this categorical scheme 
as ethically suspect. As we shall see, these divergent clinical categorizations reflected deeper 
divergences over how to control or promote women’s health, and they had substantial effects on 
women’s treatment options in hospitals. 
When Morris and van Wagenen’s procedure spread to clinics in 1966, it ushered in new 
concerns about categorization. Relaying this progress, Time Magazine described the pill as “not 
literally a contraceptive, since it does not work by preventing ovulation” like the other hormonal 
                                                          




methods available at the time (Time 1966). So, what is this new pill? Its ambiguous status took 
on legal significance in the context of contraception and abortion reform. In 1965, the US 
Supreme Court overturned state prohibitions of contraception as unconstitutional in the landmark 
case Griswold v. Connecticut. Other US state laws continued to prohibit substances intended to 
abort or miscarry; nonetheless, popular support for the legalization of abortion was swelling 
(CDD 1967). By the late 1960s, groups ranging from the American Medical Association to the 
American Baptist Convention supported legal access to abortion. The only organized opposition 
to legalization for abortion and contraception came from Roman Catholics, especially clergymen 
and physicians (see Burns 2005; Luker 1984; Williams 2016).  
 Scientists and family-planning professionals were acutely aware of this classification 
problem, which came to the fore in Santiago, Chile, during the 1967 conference of the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). The IPPF invited representatives from 
WFEB and Yale to the Global South to present their new results, which commentators agreed 
were very promising (Jackson 1967, p. 485; Parkes 1967, p. 505; Sjövall 1967, pp. 510–11). 
During the conference’s closing session, after reports from Chang, Morris, and van Wagenen, 
Thorsten Sjövall (b.1913—d.1998; Vice President of IPPF Europe and Near East Region) 
reflected on how the drug’s ambiguous classification related to these progress reports’ ethical 
significance (Sjövall 1967, p. 510). Rather than focusing on “the legally and ethically accepted 
definitions for the beginning of life” he suggested that ethical evaluations ought to prioritize “the 
subjective experience of the woman” (Sjövall 1967, p. 511). By shifting the focus from 
physiology to psychology, he reasoned that the post-coital pill might better be defined as a 
‘contraceptive’ rather than an ‘abortifacient’ because women experience it working more like the 
former than the latter.  
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 To settle ambiguities such as these, OB/GYNs began to standardize terms. The ACOG 
(established 1951) released its first volume of terminology in 1972. Morris—one of the 
researchers from Yale—was a major contributor and consultant to the effort. The volume’s 
definition of ‘conception’ aligned with the morning-after pill’s developers: “Conception is the 
implantation of the blastocyst. It is not synonymous with fertilization. SYNONYM: 
Implantation” (Hughes 1972, p. 299). ‘Pregnancy,’ defined as “the state of a female after 
conception and until termination of the gestation,” thus excluded the days before implantation 
(Hughes 1972, p. 327). And ‘abortion,’ listed as one of the “complications of pregnancy,” also 
excluded inhibitory action prior to implantation (Hughes 1972, p. 414). This terminology 
provided an alternative ontological and ethical position to the growing “Right-to-Life” 
movement, spearheaded by Catholics, who defined ‘the conception of life’ and ‘personhood’ as 
beginning at fertilization and thus defended the rights of zygotes (Williams 2016).   
Thus, Catholic OB/GYNs would now be using non-standard terms when calling the post-
coital pill an ‘abortifacient,’ such as Rock had 6 years earlier. The secular OB/GYN discipline 
and the Catholic Church had developed competing categorical schemes, with ‘pregnancy’ 
beginning at implantation and fertilization, respectively. But what about this new pill? Chang 
and Pincus considered their pill simply a post-coital form of ‘contraception’ because it interfered 
with egg transport (Lader 1966, p. 55). The Yale group classified it differently, following the 
sentiments of Sjövall: what mattered was not only the physiological mechanism but also the 
ethical and cultural significance of “how it works.” In 1973, Morris and van Wagenen proposed 
using the special category of ‘interception’ for preventing implantation (1973, p. 101). Two 
researchers had coined ‘interception’ a couple years prior because unlike ‘abortifacient’ it lacked 
undesirable psychological and ethical connotations based on “social background and moral 
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taboos” (Naqvi and Warren 1971, p. 732). The Yale team thought that estrogen administered 
after intercourse did not interfere with ovulation or fertilization or after implantation but only 
with the process of implantation. Their treatment was not quite contraceptive (pace Chang and 
Pincus) nor abortifacient (pace Rock), but rather something novel operating in between. Thus, 
the ethical stakes of this innovative treatment shaped the development of clinical classifications 
and even promoted the development of a new concept. 
 Despite the legalization of abortion in various states and then at the federal level in 1973, 
the ACOG it could not simply define away the new social movement of “Right-to-Life” 
opposition to abortion. In their Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals, the US 
bishops prohibited physicians from providing and even discussing contraception and abortion. 
The 1971 edition of the Directives prohibited post-coital contraception, stating that preventing 
implantation via endometrial curettage (scraping the uterine wall) “is morally equivalent to 
abortion,” even for treating women who had survived rape (NCCB 1971, dirs. 19 & 24).  
 As curettage gave way to hormones as the standard treatment after rape for preventing 
pregnancy, Catholics also debated the new treatment’s ethical and clinical legitimacy, in part 
because of the uncertainty surrounding its mechanism. In 1977, The Linacre Quarterly—the 
official journal of the US-based National Federation of Catholic Physicians’ Guilds—printed a 
point/counterpoint for and against DES as post-coital treatment of rape survivors. Catholic priest 
and theology professor Donald McCarthy defended the ethical permissibility of the drug, citing 
Morris and van Wagenen (1966) that it could act merely as an anovulant if given before 
ovulation. He contended that post-coital contraception would be justifiable after rape as a 
woman’s self-defense “to counter the violence of the rape aggressor” (McCarthy 1977, p. 213). 
Thus, McCarthy was willing to allow the use of a hormonal treatment in the situation of rape—
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but only if working before fertilization to prevent pregnancy. 
 In his counterpoint, William Lynch (President-elect of the National Federation of 
Catholic Physicians’ Guilds) objected, faulting McCarty for ignoring more recent work on the 
“interceptive” capacity of DES (i.e., Morris and Van Wagenen 1973). But unlike van Wagenen 
and Morris, this physician equated the new post-coital agent with abortion: “Interception by any 
other name is abortion” (Lynch 1977, p. 228). In response, McCarthy held his ground by 
objecting to Lynch’s standard for certainty: “As with all contraceptive drugs, it is difficult to 
prove absolutely that ovulation has been blocked in each individual cycle despite their known 
contraceptive effects” (McCarthy 1978, my emphasis). Like Rock previously, these Catholics 
valued knowledge about the mechanism for its ethical, ontological, and religious relevance to 
abortion and reproductive health. In contrast with Rock’s disinclination to research, their values 
motivated a disinclination to use and prescribe the now-available pill if it acted (or might act) in 
a certain way. Even for Catholics who prioritized women’s interests, such as McCarthy, the 
mechanism of treatment could preclude its ethicality when fertilization had occurred. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty of its mechanism took on heightened significance where the 
bishops’ Directives left little room for any form of contraception and banned treatments 
categorized as ‘abortifacient.’  
 Following McCarthy, the subsequent edition of the Bishop’s Directives allowed for 
hormonal treatment in hospitals but only to delay ovulation, thus necessitating a pregnancy test 
and testimony from the woman about her cycle (NCCB 1995, dir. 36). While seemingly tolerant 
and possibly even favorable of contraception, the abortion-rights group Catholics for a Free 
Choice (CFFC) conducted an undercover survey and found otherwise: this rule resulted in more 
than 4 out of 5 Catholic hospitals never providing post-coital pills to women and less than 1 out 
22 
 
of 4 offering referrals elsewhere (Bucar 1999). At that time, Catholic hospitals were more likely 
than non-affiliated hospitals to prohibit discussion, prescription, and dispensation of this 
treatment to rape survivors, despite its status as the medical standard of care (Smugar et al. 
2000). CFFC distributed its results to over 30 media outlets to shame the Catholic hierarchy and 
motivate reform (Miller 2015, pp. 174–89).  
 In sum, the novelty of the technology and the legal stakes of contraception and abortion 
encouraged physicians to develop new classificatory schemes. Their ethical and religious values 
mediated how they used their knowledge of the treatment’s mechanism to define what it was and 
to distance it from what it was not. To avoid the connotations of ‘abortion,’ pro-contraception 
scientists and physicians sought to distance the post-coital pill as merely a ‘contraceptive’ or 
‘interceptive.’ Anti-abortion Catholics rejected the ACOG’s definitions as ethically suspect, but 
Catholic advocates of women’s rights defended the morning-after pill either for limited use 
(McCarthy) or as a necessary component of women’s health care (CFFC). Related to their 
different ontological commitments, these different schemes highlight divergent conceptions of 
women’s reproductive health, either prioritizing women’s agency or circumscribing it to her 
procreative ability. Furthermore, the disagreement within each group resulted from their different 
values and the empirical uncertainties of the drug’s mechanism. 
Reflecting on this historical episode, we see how the clinical function of the mechanism 
went beyond justifying claims about effectiveness or even counselling patients accordingly—the 
evidential functions discussed extensively by existing philosophical accounts (Clarke et al. 2014; 
Dragulinescu 2017; Howick 2011; Illari 2011, 2017; La Caze 2011; Russo and Williamson 2007, 
2011, 2012; Thagard 1999). Instead, understanding the mechanism and the uncertainties 
surrounding it factored into debates over treatment categorization and prompted the expansion of 
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old categories like ‘contraception’ and the development of new concepts like ‘interception.’ 
Classifying the morning-after pill was not simply a dispassionate or abstract enterprise but a 
thoroughly ethical one with concrete stakes involving early stages of human life, treatment for 
rape survivors, and women’s rights. It pitted Catholic OB/GYNs against non-Catholics, but it 
also elucidated conflict within each group because of different values and uncertainties. As we 
shall see, struggles surrounding the mechanism and patients’ access only increased as the drug 
became more widely available outside the oversight of physicians.   
 
4. A Political Instrument for/against Access and Agency 
Finally, we move from justification in the clinic to application in the wider realm of government 
and healthcare policy. When going beyond the lab and the clinic, philosophers of science have 
acknowledged that mechanistic knowledge has the practical potential to enable control—both of 
biology (Craver and Darden 2013) and society (Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Russo 2012; Russo 
and Williamson 2012). Mechanistic knowledge has allowed humans to intervene on causal 
processes with treatments targeting the various links of the causal chain, e.g., attempts to cure or 
manage cystic fibrosis via therapy of genes, transcription factors, protein synthesis, or immune 
response. Craver and Darden call this the “pragmatic value of knowing how something works” 
(2013, pp. 186–95, my emphasis; see also Au 2016). Russo (2012) argues that evidence of 
mechanisms also provides policy makers relevant information about the available causal 
pathways for intervention so that they act on factors that are both causal and manipulable, rather 
than spurious and inaccessible (see also Russo and Williamson 2012; Marchionni and Reijula 
2019). Cartwright and Hardie (2012) argue that while RCTs can decisively “clinch” conclusions 
about treatment effectiveness at a trial, they do not provide answers to information about process, 
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which is necessary for successfully predicting whether/how a treatment will work elsewhere. 
Thus, to make reliable predictions about policy-effectiveness, they suggest policy makers reason 
mechanistically about the steps required and processes responsible for such effectiveness (see 
also Cartwright and Stegenga 2011). For instance, writing the steps from start to finish can help 
policy makers identify relevant support factors, and diagramming processes fleshes out implicit 
assumptions and potential negative feedbacks.9  
Nevertheless, as well shall see, the control afforded by mechanistic information goes 
beyond making effective interventions and policy predictions. These proposals intimate the 
social power of mechanisms, yet we can go further: this section describes how mechanistic 
information can factor into economic and legal skirmishes as an instrument of social power 
itself. In the arena of governmental regulation, both advocates and critics of the morning-after 
pill used mechanistic knowledge instrumentally to increase or limit women’s access to this 
treatment. Anti-abortion science advisers in the US advocated for labeling the morning-after pill 
Plan B as having a possible post-fertilization mechanism, and others later used this label to limit 
women’s insurance coverage. Contemporaneously, envisaging similar barriers in the majority-
Catholic country of Chile, pro-contraception scientists designed experiments to pinpoint the 
mechanism, reduce uncertainty, and promote access to the drug. Beyond utilizing or predicting 
effectiveness, these scientists and physicians throughout the Americas leveraged mechanistic 
information for or against women’s agency in medicine. To contrast the strategies of anti-
                                                          
9 Nonetheless, some philosophers have condemned such attempts to generalize or extrapolate 
from mechanistic knowledge as dubious because of the instability of mechanisms across 
populations (Howick 2011; see also La Caze 2011). 
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abortionists and women’s health advocates, this section begins with the US case and then moves 
to Chile.  
Following the discovery of the carcinogenic risks of DES in the early-70s (Hatcher and 
Conrad 1971), researchers around the world developed alternatives to estrogen, including a 
progestin-only formulation using levonorgestrel. Women’s health advocates led by Sharon Camp 
sought to increase access to this new formulation, founding the International Consortium for 
Emergency Contraception (ICEC) in 1995. However, concerns about the allegedly abortifacient 
mechanism had a market-chilling effect, creating problems for the ICEC in Australia, Burma, 
Chile, Great Britain, Mexico, the US, and elsewhere (Foster and Wynn 2012; Prescott 2011).  
 As part of ICEC’s campaign to streamline approval abroad, Camp submitted an 
application for “Plan B” to the FDA, which was approved in 1999. However, women’s health 
advocates were unsatisfied with access limited to prescription holders and adults (18+)—
restrictions they considered “special paternalistic scrutiny” without scientific or legal 
justification (Ellertson et al. 1998, p. 229). Thus, to expand women’s access to this “back-up 
birth control” (hence, Plan B), Camp applied for non-prescription sale over-the-counter. At the 
2003 science advisory meeting, the pharmaceutical sponsor argued that the active ingredient 
levonorgestrel does not act after fertilization, rendering the drug “an oral contraceptive, not an 
abortion pill” (FDA 2003, p. 31).  
 Committee member Joseph Stanford balked at this anovulatory characterization. A 
professor of family and preventive medicine at the University of Utah, Stanford was a Catholic-
influenced Mormon physician who believed human life (and personhood) begins at fertilization 
(Larimore et al. 2004; Stanford 2011). He claimed that post-fertilization action was possible 
because of the capacity of the drug to act five to six days after treatment. Therefore, it was 
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ethically necessary to communicate this possibility to patients for their informed consent (FDA 
2003, p. 271; Larimore and Stanford 2000; Kahlenborn et al. 2002). Despite alternative 
interpretations of the research, five committee members supported a label on the outside carton 
to inform patients “at the point of purchase” (FDA 2003, pp. 319, 398–411).  
 The committee approved over-the-counter sale (4-NO against 23-YES), but the FDA 
retained Plan B’s prescription-only status for almost three years because of conservative and 
religious opposition, including anti-abortion resistance (Wynn and Trussell 2006; Prescott 2011). 
In response to the objections of Stanford and two other advisers (2004), the pharmaceutical 
company included the mechanism in boldface on the final 2006 label as a “Drug Fact”: “this 
drug works mainly by preventing ovulation (egg release). It may also prevent fertilization of a 
released egg (joining of sperm and egg) or attachment of a fertilized egg to the uterus 
(implantation). See consumer information leaflet.” (FDA 2006, my emphasis). This unique drug 
label is the only instance describing a mechanism on the carton, and it was later added to the 
FDA website alongside the mechanisms of other forms of birth control (FDA 2013).  
 The FDA’s official information about the mechanism had substantial effects on women’s 
insurance coverage through the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) case. The craft store 
Hobby Lobby and the Christian bookstore Mardel claimed that governmentally required services 
such as Plan B were abortifacient and thus sued the government for violating their “religious 
freedoms.” The plaintiffs relied on FDA information about how Plan B works, and the court 
allowed them to refuse coverage for their employees as part of their religious rights (Supreme 
Court of the United States 2013, n. 6, 2014, n. 7). Thus, while the science advisors like Stanford 
had justified this label to support the agency of patients and satisfy their “right to know” (FDA 
2003, pp. 405–8), it had a different effect in court. The authoritative information gave anti-
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abortionists a political instrument with legal currency to support the agency of would-be 
providers to refuse women the drug.  
 In contrast to this case in North America, around the same time in South America, we see 
how women’s health advocates utilized mechanistic knowledge as a political instrument for 
women’s access and agency rather than against it. In Chile, the advocates of women’s health 
foresaw the potential for information about the mechanism of emergency contraception to limit 
women’s access (Schiappacasse and Díaz 2012). Because of the religious opposition to 
researching fertility control at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, physicians Horacio 
Croxatto (b. 1936) and Soledad Díaz established the Instituto Chileno de Medicina Reproductiva 
(ICMER) in 1985 in Santiago. They aimed to satisfy “the growing need for effective means to 
allow people to replace ‘all the children God wants to give me’ for ‘all the children I responsibly 
want and can have’” (translated from Croxatto 2005).  
 A decade after leaving the Pontificia Universidad, Díaz discovered that the acceptability 
of emergency contraception in Chile hinged on reversing the negative perception of its being 
“microaborto” (a “micro-abortion” acting after fertilization) from Catholics and conservatives 
(Díaz et al. 2003a, 2003b). In 2001, immediately following approval of the first dedicated 
morning-after pill in Chile, the Corte Suprema banned their manufacture and provisioning. This 
decision was based on the Chilean constitution’s explicit protection of “la vida del que está por 
nacer” (the life of the unborn) (Schiappacasse and Díaz 2012).  
 The literature available at that time on the mechanism of progestin-only emergency 
contraception was rather convoluted, especially regarding post-fertilization. Many studies 
evidenced the ability of post-coital levonorgestrel to delay or suppress ovulation (e.g., Spona et 
al. 1975; Garmendia et al. 1976; Landgren et al. 1989; Durand et al. 2001; Hapangama et al. 
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2001; Marions et al. 2002). However, its effect on fertilization was not as well studied or 
evidenced (limited to Kesserü et al. 1974, 1975), and its effects on implantation were difficult to 
replicate consistently (for positive findings, see Landgren et al. 1989; Moggia et al. 1974; Shirley 
et al. 1995; Ugocsai et al. 1984; for negative findings, see Durand et al. 2001; Marions et al. 
2002). This mixed state of the evidence enabled several scientific reviewers (including Stanford 
in the US) to claim that post-coital progestin might act after fertilization and that patients and 
providers deserve to know such (Kahlenborn et al. 2002; Larimore and Stanford 2000; Wilks 
2000).  
 Croxatto disagreed with these interpretations of the evidence, pointing instead to the 
earlier mechanisms of inhibiting ovulation and sperm migration (Croxatto et al. 2001). Previous 
studies had relied on indirect measures of embryological development, such as trial statistics, 
endometrial receptivity, and hormones levels. In contrast, using different timings of 
levonorgestrel administration, ICMER researchers made more direct measurements of 
development, including the number of eggs ovulated, fertilized, and implanted in rats (Müller et 
al. 2003); follicle size and pregnancy in Cebus monkeys (Ortiz et al. 2004); and follicle size in 
humans (Croxatto et al. 2004). In all three studies, they found this progestin inhibited or 
suppressed only ovulation—not fertilization or implantation. After the 2004 double-blind trial in 
humans, Croxatto considered the results definitely supportive of pre-fertilization mechanisms 
(Population Council 2005).  
Nonetheless, ICMER’s work was insufficient to convince beyond a reasonable doubt the 
Tribunal Constitutional in 2008 that this drug could not work after fertilization; therefore, the 
court effectively banned public provisioning of emergency contraception because of the 
mechanism (Schiappacasse and Díaz 2012). While unsuccessful in Chile, ICMER’s work 
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promoted further study that confirmed their findings (e.g., Lalitkumar et al. 2007). The empirical 
uncertainty of this pill’s mechanism seems to have lessened over time, particularly as some anti-
abortionists have come to reject a post-fertilization effect (e.g., Austriaco 2007). However, the 
controversy remains unresolved in much of North and South America, with a powerful minority 
of anti-abortionists continuing to assert the possibility of a post-fertilization effect based on 
different standards of evidence (e.g., Kahlenborn et al. 2015).10  
The situation is different in Europe. Based on these empirical developments, the ICEC 
issued joint report with the International Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology that concluded 
levonorgestrel works by inhibiting ovulation and maybe fertilization but “cannot prevent 
implantation of a fertilized egg. Language on implantation should not be included in 
[levonorgestrel emergency contraceptive pills] product labeling” (FIGO and ICEC 2011). 
Accordingly, the French manufacturer of the levonorgestrel-only pill NorLevo removed 
reference to implantation in its information leaflets for doctors and patients (HAS 2015). Part of 
the reason for this discrepancy between Europe and elsewhere is the relatively lesser political 
clout of anti-abortionists and the Catholic Church in much of the continent. The supporters of the 
morning-after pill in Chile also sought to quell political opposition by producing mechanistic 
knowledge for women’s access and agency. Croxatto and Díaz granted the importance of 
patients’ values but were not willing to obstruct access without what they took to be strong 
evidence against post-fertilization action.  
 In these governmental arenas, the role of mechanistic knowledge was pragmatic but 
                                                          
10 While beyond the scope of this paper, I think that such standards are empirically unsatisfiable 
and thus deceptive.  
30 
 
beyond the specific sense offered by philosophers of predicting or intervening effectively 
through treatment and policy (Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Cartwright and Stegenga 2011; 
Craver and Darden 2013; Darden 2006; Marchionni and Reijula 2019; Russo 2012; Russo and 
Williamson 2012). Instead, scientists leveraged knowledge about the mechanism in regulatory 
battles as epistemic means for their political goals. They saw the legal and political utility of 
information about mechanisms, either for or against access, and as science advisers or 
researchers they produced and promulgated those forms of information for governmental bodies. 
The US opposition used its mechanistic knowledge to create warning labels about post-
fertilization possibilities. Corporations later used this information to challenge their legal 
obligation to provide such pills in order to protect their “religious freedom” and the zygotic life 
they considered to have legal and human rights. In turn, the information disabled women as 
patients and consumers by restricting their coverage and access. In contrast, Chilean advocates 
challenged these claims with a carefully designed set of experiments, which ultimately 
influenced the labeling in Europe. In both episodes, values mediated how scientists used their 
knowledge of the mechanism: either to protect the agency and economic interests of would-be 
providers or to increase women’s access and agency. Mechanistic information provided scientists 
a political instrument for achieving their political goals, again showcasing how knowledge about 
mechanisms is used for more than immediate therapeutic effectiveness.  
 
5. A Broader Scope for Understanding Mechanisms  
Having moved back and forth between the abstractions of philosophy and the particulars of 
history, this paper analyzed the production and use of mechanistic knowledge through several 
episodes in labs, clinics, and beyond. This section reflects on this HPS iteration and the 
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challenges it raises for existing philosophical accounts. As we’ve seen throughout, the 
philosophical conversation on mechanisms is ready to be expanded. To recapitulate: rather than 
merely providing a heuristic for discovery, reasoning about mechanisms offers moral guidance 
when considering intervening on a process related to ethics or politics (Section 2). Aside from its 
possible evidential import for justifying effectiveness, knowledge about mechanisms informs 
clinicians in their categorization of treatments by relating medical definitions to their ethical 
connotations and political stakes (Section 3). Finally, instead of functioning as a tool only for 
making effective applications and policy, mechanistic information can also factor into political 
struggles as an economic and legal tool for achieving certain goals and undermining others 
(Section 4).  
 Because philosophers wish to provide practical and applicable accounts of mechanism, 
the time has come to broaden our scope to attend to the variety of challenges faced by scientific 
practitioners, physicians, and policy makers. While the three proposals of philosophers (heuristic 
for discovery, evidence of effectiveness, and instrument for effective control) provide important 
insights into scientific practice, they constitute a limited set of the possible reasons that 
researchers, clinicians, and institutions take mechanisms to be important. The limitation itself 
points to a deeper issue about our philosophical scope. The existing accounts of mechanisms 
focus the imminent and proximate issue of a drug’s effectiveness: either creating, understanding, 
or utilizing treatments that produce a desired effect. Mechanistic reasoning does often shape 
scientific practice toward effective treatments; however, we have seen how scientific and social 
interests in mechanistic knowledge do not always arise from desires to develop effective drugs, 
justify claims about their effectiveness, or plan effective interventions. The next step in the 
philosophy of mechanisms is to articulate the broader function of mechanistic knowledge and 
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reasoning. Typified by these episodes in the history of the morning-after pill, a more holistic and 
contextual understanding should attend to human values and the social aspects of biomedicine 
and health policy.  
Across these historical episodes, we have seen how mechanistic reasoning relates not 
only to whether a treatment produces an effect that is desired, but whether, when, and why that 
effect and that treatment are desirable in the first place. In so far as knowledge of a drug’s 
mechanism relates only to therapeutic effectiveness, one must take for granted the desirability of 
the effect and thus the desirability of having an effective treatment. That is, if it remains 
uncontested that an effective treatment is wanted or needed regardless of the physiological 
mechanism, then the existing functions proffered by philosophers might suffice. A simple 
example might be cancer, which easily evinces widespread public contempt and has even 
provoked the so-called “War on Cancer.” If all is fair in love and war, then the means by which 
we battle cancer matter little apart from their potential for victory (i.e., effectiveness). For 
simplified cases of uncontested targets, it is possible that scientists could strive to make the 
treatment happen, thinking about mechanisms without moral reflection or political implications.  
However, when the treatment itself is contested as a legitimate form of medicine or 
politicized otherwise, then we need to go beyond effectiveness to understand the holistic and 
contextual significance of mechanistic reasoning. The “War on Cancer” is a telling example: 
industry and anti-regulation advocates designed this wartime rhetoric to motivate streamlined 
approval for cancer treatment and to distract from preventative policies that would reduce 
industry profit (Coleman 2013; Davis 2007). Furthermore, we need to think more broadly and 
critically about what ‘effectiveness’ even means. The case of the morning-after pill supports 
these imperatives. Emergency contraception is desired by many for improving women’s health 
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and increasing self-determination, in part because their ontological and ethical beliefs about 
women’s bodies encourage effectiveness after fertilization. However, this very form of treatment 
is contested by others for its temporal proximity to abortion and its physiological potential to act 
indiscriminately after an ontological change that they deem ethically significant (namely, 
fertilization). Since knowledge about mechanisms is important for defining technologies as 
‘contraceptive,’ ‘abortifacient,’ or otherwise, biological mechanisms are integrally connected 
with value-laden ontological and ethical beliefs. When intervening on causal processes carries 
such societal stakes, we should expect mechanistic knowledge and reasoning to connect with 
these other aspects of human life involving norms and values.  
We are now well posed to reorient the philosophical discussion about the production and 
use of mechanistic knowledge. Certainly, as philosophers have been arguing, “mechanisms 
matter!” Yet, as we’ve seen throughout these episodes with the morning-after pill, interest in the 
mechanism of action ultimately derives from how knowledge about it allows us to understand, 
promote, or control health for individual patients and society. Thinking mechanistically involves 
the potential to reorder human individuals and societies toward normal and normative states, 
with all the social norms, ethical values, and political stakes such interventions entail. In the 
case of women’s reproductive health, medicine is clearly a thoroughly ethical and political 
enterprise (Wynn and Trussell 2006). Many view contraception and abortion as constitutive of 
women’s health, but access to these treatments remains under constant threat throughout the 
world (Foster and Wynn 2012). In the US, the courts have reduced federal requirements for 
insurance coverage of contraceptives while state legislatures continue to chip away at the number 
of abortion facilities and providers with overly burdensome regulations (Guttmacher Institute 
2018). This study suggests philosophers ought to consider the broader functions of mechanisms 
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for scientists, patients, providers, policy makers, and society—particularly if we want to do more 
socially relevant philosophy of science (Fehr and Plaisance 2010; Weaver 2017).  
Now, one might wonder about the extent to which this need for a broader scope can be 
generalized beyond or abstracted from my case study and the context of women’s reproductive 
health. When must we go beyond effectiveness to understand the production and use of 
mechanistic knowledge? How frequently does mechanistic reasoning involve these humanistic 
and cultural issues? Rather than generalizing from a single case, I have sought instead to bring 
new perspectives to our understanding of mechanisms that are cogent and broadly applicable 
(see H. Chang 2011). Thus, I aim to go beyond my case study and the context of women’s 
reproductive health to mechanisms in science and medicine more broadly. To show that my 
argument is about specifically mechanistic knowledge (and the associated philosophy of 
mechanisms) rather than any politically or ethically relevant knowledge in science, I need make 
the case for its applicability within that class of knowledge.11 I will make this case using three 
issues that span across biomedicine and health policy, beginning with early-life and near-death 
interventions and ending with pharmaceutical development. These examples encompass 
embryology, cardiology, neurology, pharmacology, and translational medicine.  
First, the production and use of mechanistic knowledge in human-embryo research (e.g., 
IVF, embryonic stem cells, and cloning) shares many features with the morning-after pill, 
illustrating the prevalence of such issues throughout embryology and reproductive health. For 
instance, during the 1980s and ‘90s, mechanistic reasoning about the timing of conception 
                                                          




provided similar moral guidance for/against intervention during the spread of IVF clinics. 
Subsequent ethical oversight of such practices prompted the creation of the new category of 
‘preembryo’ (or, not quite an embryo) referring to the first 14 days after fertilization, with 
mechanistic knowledge again aiding categorization for clinics over ethical terrain. The National 
Institutes of Health’s “14-day rule” limits research on human embryos beyond the point of 
gastrulation, following resistance from advocates of embryos’ human rights. The rationale 
behind the rule was “pluralistic” and mechanistic: this biologically significant point of transition 
served as a compromise between those with different values regarding prenatal life (see Hurlbut 
2017).   
Like early-life interventions, the desirability of near-death treatments also turns on issues 
surrounding the parts of the process. The controversies over brain death illustrate how 
mechanistic reasoning outside embryology and reproductive health relates to ethical and cultural 
values other than when life begins. In the late 1960s, doctors faced new ethical concerns about 
organ transplants and life support. An ad hoc committee at Harvard Medical School influentially 
argued that the medical definition of ‘death’ ought to be the cessation of neural activity (hence 
‘brain death’) resulting in an irreversible coma, rather than the traditional definition based on the 
cessation of cardiovascular activity. The committee justified this novel criterion for death based 
on the decreased suffering of family members and those seeking organs as well as the need for a 
new criterion for terminating life-sustaining treatment (Rothman 2003). While widely accepted 
in the US and elsewhere, not everywhere followed so quickly, particularly in Japan and Israel. In 
traditional Japanese culture, death was observed as a communal process. Thus, rather than a 
single moment in an individual’s life, a person’s death was a recognition of this change by their 
community that extended in time. Public resistance to assimilating the Western concept of brain 
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death was based in part to these divergent values and norms related to personhood and death 
(Hoshino 1993; Nudeshima 1991). In Israel, as a comparison, there were controversies over 
interpreting authoritative Jewish texts regarding the definite signs of life, such as breath, 
heartbeat, and procreation. One crucial consideration was whether ‘death’ involved loss of blood 
flow to the head, rendering it a biological process like decapitation, which was widely viewed as 
a sign of certain death (Gross et al. 2018). Across these contexts, we see how mechanistic 
reasoning about the process of death involved ethical issues, like the termination of life-
sustaining treatment, and cultural norms, like the recognition of death by one’s community. 
Outside issues common in bioethics, the design and structure of biomedical research 
illustrate how pharmaceutical companies use mechanistic knowledge for financial gain. Consider 
the design of surrogate endpoints, which researchers use to evaluate the effectiveness of drugs in 
the place of more patient-relevant outcomes like morbidity and mortality. The possible 
therapeutic significance of mechanisms for evidencing effectiveness via surrogate endpoints can 
be outweighed by commercial pressures. Why? Systemic problems with industry funding can 
overwhelm our knowledge base without corrupting the reasoning of individuals (Holman and 
Bruner 2017). For instance, during the 1980s, anti-arrhythmic drugs became popular treatments 
for patients who had suffered heart attacks. The trials evidencing their effectiveness, however, 
were based on the endpoint of suppressing arrhythmias rather than reducing deaths. While nearly 
all arrhythmias were harmless, a substantial portion of heart attacks were precipitated by them, 
which researchers and physicians took as evidence of their key role in the process. (They 
reasoned mechanistically that when the ventricle contracts arrhythmically with an extra beat 
before it has time to refill, it could at times damage the lungs, brain, and kidneys and ultimately 
lead to the mortality risk observed.) However, Bennett Holman (2017) has argued that the 
37 
 
surrogate endpoint gained credence not simply on the ground of mechanistic reasoning: more 
instrumentally, the drug industry shaped the medical discussion by manufacturing expert 
consensus over it for FDA approval. By supporting researchers with pro-industry results, the 
drug sponsor amplified the impact of commercially favorable articles to promote this lucrative 
mechanistic knowledge. While there was a body of evidence supporting the arrhythmias-
suppression mechanism, this evidence itself was the result of sustained pressure from industry to 
justify the use of these drugs. Therefore, the very category of ‘effectiveness’ has economic value 
that influences how mechanistic knowledge is produced and used.    
This case of the commercialization of mechanistic knowledge might seem ethically or 
epistemically vicious. Nonetheless, such uses (or abuses) of mechanistic reasoning are common 
in “translational medicine,” which aims to expediate the time “from bench to beside” (Solomon 
2015). Drug companies have partnered with universities to secure governmental funding of 
“basic research” on mechanisms and to externalize the costly risks of early development—all 
while still securing knowledge with commercial potential for new markets down the road 
(Robinson 2018). Because of the entanglement of commercial and medical interests, biomedical 
researchers and their industry benefactors can utilize mechanistic reasoning to make dubious 
claims about therapeutically irrelevant effectiveness for financial gain. Commercial pressures 
also disincentivize less lucrative forms of mechanistic reasoning. In the case of bacterial 
resistance to antibiotics, Ashley Graham Kennedy (2018) argues that developers could utilize the 
mechanisms of evolution to re-sensitizing bacteria that have acquired antibiotic resistance and 
recycle old drugs. However, industry appears to be ignoring this mechanistic knowledge because 
of the financial incentives for creating new drugs and markets.  
In sum, the cultural norms, ethical values, and economic currency associated with ‘life,’ 
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‘death,’ and ‘effectiveness’ shape mechanistic reasoning in the design and use of 
pharmaceuticals and other treatments. This variety of examples suggests that well beyond the 
morning-after pill and outside women’s reproductive health, it is common for the desirability of 
drugs to hinge on their mechanisms.  
 
6. Socially Relevant Medical Epistemology  
This analysis provides a constructive expansion on the existing work from philosophers, who 
have already done much to explain the epistemic and methodological significance of 
mechanisms in science. Philosophers have illustrated the many ways that societal values actually 
and inevitably shape scientific research and science policy, for better and for worse (ChoGlueck 
2018; Douglas 2009; Elliott 2011; Kitcher 2011; Longino 1990; Weaver 2017). Likewise, this 
paper attempts to broaden the existing scope of philosophies of mechanism by providing a richer 
description of how mechanistic knowledge functions in biomedicine and health policy. 
Accounting for social forces improves our understanding of the value-laden dimensions of 
scientific reasoning and how they vary across context, specifically for mechanisms (see Holman 
2017; Kennedy 2018; Robinson 2018). This descriptive project aims ultimately at the more 
normative and critical one of improving how contextual values function in biomedicine and 
health policy. While direct guidance is beyond purview of this paper, it does have several 
implications regarding the philosophy of science and values, research ethics, science pedagogy, 
and science advising, which I will discuss briefly.  
 Values have distinct implications for medical epistemology about mechanisms. In several 
ways, we have seen how values generate “epistemic friction” by influencing what scientists and 
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physicians know about mechanisms, how they produce that knowledge, and how they use it.12 
For instance, concerns about the morning-after pill’s mechanism altered the expertise and 
knowledge either available or absent during early development. Personal moral values (and 
differences between them) have direct consequences on the methods available to a lab for how it 
could intervene, such as the absence of Rock’s background with human trials and the availability 
of Chang’s proficiency with non-human animals. Furthermore, scientists can be inclined to 
intervene more specifically and at one point rather than another because of the moral valence of 
one part of a causal process, such as fertilization for its desired contraceptive capacity or its 
feared abortifacient potential. 
  The implications of values in clinics were different but no less definite. The ethical and 
religious beliefs of clinicians and healthcare institutions promoted the development of new 
concepts and categories. These values not only limited knowledge production but more pro-
actively molded it toward certain norms of health, such as with liminal, ethically ambiguous 
concepts like ‘interception.’ Moreover, as treatments spread and the number of users and 
providers increases, there is a richer diversity of value judgments over how to handle 
uncertainties. This can lead to disagreement among those with similar beliefs, as we saw with 
women’s health advocates, anti-abortionists, and Catholics.  
 Values in governmental contexts have different effects. Political battles create feedback 
effects on the production of knowledge about mechanisms, and mechanistic interests prompt 
scientists and physicians to act as advocates by promulgating specific forms of information for 
                                                          
12 I thank Robyn Bluhm, David Teira, and an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to expound 
on these epistemic implications of value-ladenness.   
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governmental bodies and producing new sorts of knowledge. Researchers’ values are embodied 
in their standards of evidence, but their standards must pass legal muster to accomplish their 
desired political goals. Compare Stanford’s anti-abortion advocacy as an adviser in the FDA with 
Croxatto and Díaz’s pro-contraceptive advocacy as researchers in a mostly Catholic context. The 
former found the available evidence enough to support his position against the pill, and he could 
justify his standard of evidence based on the generally accepted right of patients to know. The 
latter, in contrast, were unsatisfied with the evidence and thus produced new knowledge with 
more exacting methods to pinpoint the mechanism step-by-step. Yet, their standard of evidence 
was insufficient in Chile given the legal protections for the rights of the unborn.   
Beyond its intellectual contributions, my analysis also has broader implications for 
society at large. While contraception and abortion are common topics for bioethicists, they have 
not attracted the attention of philosophers of science and medicine, potentially seen as primarily 
ethical issues without epistemic relevance. Such an assumption would be wrong, but it would 
also be androcentric by overlooking women’s widespread use of contraception and its necessity 
as an essential medicine (Daniels, Jones, et al. 2013; Daniels, Mosher, et al. 2013; WHO 2017). 
Furthermore, it would render our philosophy socially irrelevant and impotent for making 
meaningful attempts to understand and improve medicine. As Holman (2017) argues, a “friction-
free epistemology” that abstracts from sociological forces is not very helpful for capturing the 
real-world pressures that are constitutive of medicine. 
In contrast, this sort of study can inform critical efforts in research ethics and science 
pedagogy. For instance, in labs with ethically and politically sensitive objects of inquiry, these 
real-world examples enable students and practitioners to see how mechanistic reasoning relates 
to questions beyond immediate effectiveness for reaching some given endpoint. Creative 
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approaches to ethics education are crucial for developing scientists’ epistemic and moral 
responsibilities beyond their personal values and individual responsibility (Douglas 2014; Rolin 
2017). This analysis guides us through rethinking the criterion of effectiveness as not necessarily 
desirable and probing the connections between ontology, ethics, politics, and epistemology. 
These historical episodes can help researchers and students contrast alternative values and point 
to previous ways of handling difficult issues. Accordingly, they can learn how to connect the 
different layers of mechanistic reasoning, including normative dimensions, and consider the 
possible epistemic and practical consequences downstream.   
In addition, this analysis illustrates the epistemic means by which science advisers can 
attempt to influence governmental agencies and the courts, particularly how they can succeed 
and fail as advocates. While philosophers of science have sought to provide practicable guidance 
for science advisors (e.g., Douglas 2009; Steele 2012), their suggestions of avoiding wishful 
thinking and implementing rational decision theory do not address some of the political realities 
of the contentious advisory process. For one, science advisors wield significant political power in 
policy making, akin to a “fifth branch” of government (Jasanoff 1990). At the time of the FDA 
labeling, anti-abortion advisers expressed concerns for the rights of women as consumers who 
were opposed to abortion. Yet, their label’s larger achievement for anti-abortionists was in 
advocacy for the rights of employers to refuse insurance coverage based on “religious freedom.” 
Second, this analysis illustrates the need for the courts to reconsider the seeming value-freedom 
of information. “Drug Facts” produced by the FDA can be value-laden with special interests, 
such as how anti-abortion advisers advocated for a warning label to protect zygotic life. Because 
of how its authoritativeness overshadowed its political function, this mechanistic knowledge 
effectively restricted women’s healthcare options and agency.  
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If we want to practice socially relevant philosophy of science, the time has come to 
connect medical epistemology with the cultural and value-laden aspects of biomedical research 
and clinical practice as well as the politics of health (Fehr and Plaisance 2010). Such links are 
important for understanding drug development, where industry wields significant power, and 
particularly for reproductive health, where conflicting values and gender politics limit women’s 
access and agency. As scientists develop new means of contraception and abortion, these 
technologies will continue to be evaluated according to these shifting social stakes that hinge in 
part on the mechanism of action. Epistemology in context and in practice is full of contentions, 
but so is medicine. By accounting for the specific challenges that arise with mechanistic 
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